

# *Pluralism & Proofs*

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THE UNIVERSITY OF  
MELBOURNE

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## Motivation

Intuitionist, Dual-Intuitionist  
and Classical Negation

Three Negations in One Logic ...

... or One Negation in Three Logics

*motivation*

# *Logical Pluralism*

# MOTIVATION #1

*Disjunctive Syllogism  
& Inconsistency*

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$$p \vee q, \neg p \vdash? q$$

*Disjunctive Syllogism  
& Inconsistency*

$p \vee q, \neg p \vdash? q$

*Yes, and no.*

## MOTIVATION #2

# *Constructive Mathematics*

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
$$\neg\neg p \vdash? p$$

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
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*Yes, and no.*

# A Picture




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


WORLDS

# A Picture



# A Picture



*One language,  
different  
consequence relations.*



Logical Pluralism

JC Beall and Greg Restall

# REGRET #1

*Not much of an account of proof*

## REGRET #2

*Not much logic*

# REALISATION #1

*Lots of people are sympathetic  
with logical pluralism ...*

# REALISATION #2

*... but not so many are pluralists in **our** sense*

*Articulate and explain the  
differences in pluralisms  
and deal with the regrets  
in one go.*

We'll use *proof* to explain  
the difference between

One Language,  
Many Logics

Many Languages,  
One Logic.

*intuitionist  
dual-intuitionist  
& classical  
negation*

# Classical Negation

$$\frac{X \vdash A, Y}{X, \neg A \vdash Y} [\neg L]$$

$$\frac{X, A \vdash Y}{X \vdash \neg A, Y} [\neg R]$$

# Intuitionist Negation

$$\frac{X \vdash A}{X, \neg A \vdash} [\neg L]$$

$$\frac{X, A \vdash}{X \vdash \neg A} [\neg R]$$

# Dual-Intuitionist Negation

$$\frac{\vdash A, Y}{\neg A \vdash Y} [\neg L]$$

$$\frac{A \vdash Y}{\vdash \neg A, Y} [\neg R]$$

# Classical Derivations

$$\frac{\frac{p \vdash p}{p, \neg p \vdash} [\neg L]}{p \vdash \neg\neg p} [\neg R]$$

$$\frac{\frac{p \vdash p}{\vdash \neg p, p} [\neg R]}{\neg\neg p \vdash p} [\neg L]$$

$$\frac{\frac{p \vdash p}{\vdash p, \neg p} [\neg R]}{\vdash p \vee \neg p} [\vee R]$$

$$\frac{\frac{p \vdash p}{p, \neg p \vdash} [\neg L]}{p \wedge \neg p \vdash} [\wedge L]$$

# Intuitionist Derivations

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# Dual Intuitionist Derivations

$$\frac{\frac{p \vdash p}{p, \neg p \vdash} [\neg L]}{p \vdash \neg\neg p} [\neg R]$$

$$\frac{\frac{p \vdash p}{\vdash \neg p, p} [\neg R]}{\neg\neg p \vdash p} [\neg L]$$

$$\frac{\frac{p \vdash p}{\vdash p, \neg p} [\neg R]}{\vdash p \vee \neg p} [\vee R]$$

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- ▶ A dual-intuitionist derivation *is* a classical derivation in which the negation steps satisfy the constraint: *at most one formula present on the LHS*.

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- ▶ And some have *all three* virtues.

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
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
CLASSICAL DERIVATIONS

INTUITIONIST  
DERIVATIONS

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*One language, three logics.*

*three negations in  
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$$x \models \neg A \text{ iff } x \not\models A$$

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$$x \Vdash \neg A \text{ iff } x \not\Vdash A$$

$(X \vdash_{\mathcal{K}} Y$  iff there's no  $x$  where  $x \Vdash A$  for each  $A \in X$  and  $x \not\Vdash B$  for each  $B \in Y$ )

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And these are all (very) different.

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- ▶ Does this make sense, from a pluralist perspective?
- ▶ Yes, for a Carnapian (you can be *bilingual*).
- ▶ Not so much, for me.

At least, it's not the *only* way to understand the relationship between intuitionist, dual-intuitionist and classical negation.

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We'll look at them *proof theoretically* to give an example of a stance from which the three-negations-in-one-model is not so natural.

*... or one negation  
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This works for  $\not\vdash_K$ ,  $\not\vdash_J$  and  $\not\vdash_{DJ}$ .

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- ▶ Classically invalid? — *A world*
- ▶ Intuitionistically invalid? — *A warrant*
- ▶ Dual Intuitionistically invalid? — *A ???*

$A$  is true at  $[\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y}]$  iff  $A \in \mathcal{X}$ .

# Conjunction

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# Disjunction

Exercise left to the listener.

HINT: dualise.

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This relies on having  $A, \neg A \vdash$  and  $\vdash A, \neg A$ , so it works for  $\vdash_K$ , but neither  $\vdash_J$  nor  $\vdash_{DJ}$ .

## For Warrants

FACT: If  $[\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y}]$  is a *warrant*, then  $\neg A$  is true at  $[\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y}]$  iff  $A$  is not true at any warrant  $[\mathcal{X}', \mathcal{Y}']$  where  $\mathcal{X} \subseteq \mathcal{X}'$ .

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Suppose  $\neg A$  is not in  $\mathcal{X}$ . So, since points are partitons,  $\neg A$  in  $\mathcal{Y}$ . Then, since  $\mathcal{X} \not\vdash \neg A$  for any  $\mathcal{X} \subseteq \mathcal{X}$ , we must have  $\mathcal{X}, A \not\vdash$  for any  $\mathcal{X} \subseteq \mathcal{X}$  too. So, it follows that there is a point extending  $[\mathcal{X} \cup \{A\}, \ ]$ . This is a point  $[\mathcal{X}', \mathcal{Y}']$  at which  $A$  is true. Contraposing, if  $A$  is not true at  $[\mathcal{X}', \mathcal{Y}']$  for each  $\mathcal{X}' \supseteq \mathcal{X}$ , then  $\neg A$  is in  $\mathcal{X}$ .

## For Dual-Intuitionistically Invalid Points


FACT: If  $[\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y}]$  is *dual-intuitionistically invalid*, then  $\neg A$  is true at  $[\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y}]$  iff  $A$  is not true at some point  $[\mathcal{X}', \mathcal{Y}']$  where  $\mathcal{Y} \subseteq \mathcal{Y}'$ .

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Proof: *dualise*.

# The Final Picture




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


WORLDS


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
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*thank you!*